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WOMEN, MEN, AND EMPIRES OF LAW
“The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England”: The Jury in the History of the
Common Law. Edited by JOHN W. CAIRNS and GRANT MCLEOD. Oxford and
Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing, 2002. Pp.xxi243. $80.00 (cloth).
The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750–1850. By ALLYSON N. MAY. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Pp. xii361. $49.95 (cloth).
Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England. By GARTHINE WALKER.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi310. $60.00 (cloth).
Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire. Edited by DIANE KIRKBY and
CATHARINE COLEBORNE. Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 2001. Pp. xii307. $117.00 (cloth).
Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands of the
British Diaspora—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
1600–1900. By PETER KARSTEN. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pp. xvi560. $95.00 (cloth).
Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900. By
LAUREN BENTON. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiii285.
$65.00 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).
The six books reviewed here cover a wide topical, geographical, and temporal
range. Some concentrate on details of legal doctrine or practice in one or more
jurisdictions, and why these changed; others are more concerned with the ways
in which law permeated other kinds of social relations and reflected them, as part
of a culture; and several are broadly comparative, over centuries and continents
and world legal regimes. The best have several or all of these strengths. Most were
written by historians with a particular interest in law or by lawyers with a particular
interest in history; there is also at least one representative each of sociology and
anthropology, informed and curious about high law and low. All have much to
say to historians of politics, gender, economy, culture, race, social structure, and
imperialism.
The first three titles are all closely focused on juries, courts, and the implications
of legal doctrine as it worked in practice. The jury collection edited by Cairns and
McLeod greatly expands our knowledge of an institution central to both the
workings and the mythologies of common law countries.1 It is the fate of con-
tributors to collections to receive only brief notices, but chapters on the jury of
medieval Wales (Dafydd Jenkins), the jury in manor courts (Maureen Mulholland),
1 Cairns and McLeod’s book comprises selections from the papers at the Fourteenth British Legal
History Conference, Edinburgh, July 1999.
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petty larceny and mercy in the thirteenth century (Roger D. Groot), jurors’ han-
dling of forgery at the Old Bailey in the early nineteenth (Philip Handler), Wig-
more and Thayer’s theory of the role of juries in explaining the origins of the
hearsay rule (Richard A. Friedman), the moral and political significance of the jury
in England and the United States (J. R. Pole), and suits for malicious prosecution
(Joshua Getzler) all present new and important evidence, often on areas that have
seen much recent writing. James Oldham shows the usefulness of the digital version
of the English Reports,2 in spite of its multiple misprints, to revisit and update
some of his important earlier work on the jury of matrons, special merchant juries,
and the historical background relevant to arguments about the constitutional en-
trenchment of juries in the American Constitution.
Two articles on civil juries open new territory. John Cairns tells us what happened
when a largely civilian system, Scotland, tried to accommodate the most distinctive
common law institution when the jury was introduced for civil cases in 1816 (the
Scots criminal jury, on the other hand, had deep historical roots). The motives
for introducing civil juries were mixed: reducing the power of Scots judges, em-
phasizing the union, advancing democracy and/or civil liberties. The historical
moment, the first half of the nineteenth century, saw increasing deference in Scots
courts to British legislation and the common law, in part through the precedents
imposed on Scotland by the House of Lords, a tribunal swamped with Scots appeals
allegedly because of the lack of general verdicts in a system without juries. The
delays and uncertain conclusions of written “Roman-Scots” law, descended from
Romano-canonical procedure (leading to all those appeals) suggested to some that
juries, neatly deciding the facts and leaving the law to the judges, would improve
the assessment of both and efficiency above all. The innovation seems likely to
have hastened the decline of the institutional tradition in Scots law, and although
the vicissitudes of the civil jury in Scotland need further work, as Cairns concedes,
a host of questions and comparisons to the common law civil jury are suggested.
Michael Lobban gives an excellent survey of the English nineteenth-century
civil jury, an animal about which we know far less than we do about its criminal
counterpart. He explains its survival in the English high courts, in spite of wide-
spread criticism of the perversity of jurors, as due to the response of conservative
lawyers and judges and the importance of constitutional sensitivities in both the
profession and the public. The lawyers were preoccupied with the problems of
merging equity and common law procedure. Changes in pleading, distrust of
affidavit evidence, and a willingness to preserve common law juries rather than
introduce them to courts of equity, whose practitioners felt uncomfortable ad-
dressing jurors, all kept common law civil juries in business. Jurors continued to
be of great importance in English law into the twentieth century, particularly in
tort cases, and Lobban’s elucidation of the debates, legislation, and statistics is
the first since R. M. Jackson’s pioneering article in the 1930s and much more
revealing. The special significance of the nineteenth-century special jury (more
qualified, more wealthy, more knowledgeable), especially in London, is explored
here in detail for the first time. Lobban also shows that jury service, supposedly
the democratic leaven in the figgy pudding of English justice, was the experience
of only one percent of the population, all male, carefully selected from the wealthy
2 Published by Juristat, and available now in an online version as well as on CD-ROM.
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and respectable by sheriffs and their assistants, who displayed an exquisite sensitivity
to the claims of rank and the dangers of working-class perversity and ignorance.
That is perhaps not surprising in a nation that had one of the most undemocratic
franchises in the Western world until after World War I.
Allyson May’s The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750–1850 takes us into one of the
archetypal sites of perversity and ignorance, but by illuminating some dark corners
she makes it a much more interesting place. In much of the literature and some
contemporary comment, the perversity and ignorance was that of the Old Bailey’s
lawyers, often represented as rather like counsel in some inferior criminal courts
today: inexperienced youngsters, burnt-out failures, and the corrupt. This version
of Old Bailey justice has become one of the arguments in assessing reconstructions
(from the published reports of the Old Bailey Sessions) of the evolution of the
felony trial from its early modern rather inquisitorial form to its modern adversarial
structure. David Cairns has argued that John Beattie, John Langbein, and others
have exaggerated the competence and significance of Old Bailey advocacy and
therefore misrepresented the timing of the emergence of the truly modern ad-
versarial trial.3 On the other hand, David Lemmings has suggested that counsel
at the Old Bailey in the late eighteenth century were self-conscious “tribunes of
the people,” anxious to address juries in the protection of civil liberties, and that
they therefore received, and merited, respect from their fellow citizens. (Meanwhile
most other barristers and judges were excoriated for gorging on fees that denied
justice to all but the rich.)4
May (a student of Beattie) accepts neither of these generalizations about the
Old Bailey bar in her presentation of a detailed and convincing account of its
members and the complexities of criminal practice. She argues that the notoriety
of the Old Bailey by the mid-nineteenth century arose partly from press caricature
and London politics, partly from real alarm about the moral implications of the
Prisoners’ Counsel Act of 1836, which now allowed silver-tongued advocates to
speak for silent defendants. Trials did not change immediately after 1836, but
change became inevitable. With respect to civil liberties, she concedes a cult fol-
lowing for Thomas Erskine and a few other famous barristers among democrats
and the poor in the late eighteenth century but finds (not surprisingly) that most
Old Bailey lawyers were anything but radicals, dedicated above all to making a
living in the courts of the city because reputation in Westminster Hall eluded
them. They were apparently opposed to the introduction of full rights of counsel
(the project of whig politicians) a generation later. One of the most interesting
chapters in the book describes the ensuing debate about the moral implications
of advocacy on behalf of guilty defendants and the acceptance, by 1849, of the
modern view of the right to a full defense. May gives us a thoughtful summary
of a great deal of recent research, as well as a revealing collective biography and
assessment of the Old Bailey and City of London bar. She surveys the current
learning on the dynamics and public significance of pretrial procedure and the
3 David J. A. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 1800–1865 (Oxford,
1998), pp. 29–36. See John Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford, 2003), for
his summation of the value of Old Bailey reports and advocacy there.
4 David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth
Century (Oxford, 2000), pp. 205–25.
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felony trial itself in its century of transition, and she provides much detail from
archival sources about the Old Bailey version, giving a vivid understanding of the
difficulties defense counsel faced in the eighteenth century and of the incremental
steps by which the nature of criminal law changed. This is an important and very
readable contribution to our understanding of criminal procedure, the legal pro-
fessions, and London crime.
Although virtually all the archival evidence in Garthine Walker’s book comes
from Cheshire and is deployed in many bar charts and narrative sequences, she
insists that it is not a full county study of the administration of the law, since it
ignores all courts but quarter sessions and the Palatinate’s great sessions, which
had the jurisdiction of assizes in other counties. (Her criterion implies that no
such county study has yet been written.) The goal is rather to elucidate the law,
cultural meanings, and social practices that gendered justice. The argument is
founded on the Cheshire archives but also on wide reading in legal treatises
(though not the reported cases), other printed primary material, and a wide range
of secondary literature. Honor, the household, war, the image of Charles I (man
of blood or father of his people), and representations of ideal womanhood are all
used to comment on and to explicate the stories and statistical patterns arising
from the court records and beliefs about violence, theft, and state law. A central
argument is that male pride strongly conditioned descriptions of female violence,
even the willingness to admit its existence. Some gestures to theoretical issues
(Mikhail Bakhtin in particular is invoked) are not as fully developed as aficionados
would wish, but the material is never less than interesting, and Walker’s arguments
and evidence reveal inarticulate assumptions in both the historiography and the
law of early modern England.
Walker focuses on physical violence and theft but widens the view to scolds,
forcible rescues, illegal cottages, bastardy. Her approach is exemplified in the central
chapter on “Homicide, Gender, and Justice,” in which she interrogates repeated
statements in the literature that women were treated more leniently than men by
the criminal law and that certain crimes particularly carried the stamp of gender
bias. She contests both as oversimplifications. The usual position is that women
were prosecuted, put on trial, convicted, and executed less often than men; the
explanation has often been male assumptions (including those of historians) of
women’s physical weakness or subordination or of men’s chivalry (however in-
terpreted). Walker argues rather that the structure of the law, especially its cate-
gories of legitimate defenses, strongly shaped the experience, and record, of women
defendants. In particular, the force and assertion acceptable in women’s defense
of their households, often with weapons and celebrated in images of righteously
avenging viragos, which she describes in an earlier chapter, had no place whatever
in cultural valuations of women committing intimate and domestic violence. The
contrast with men was great. Men killing other men, women, or children, including
their intimates, were offered a range of legal exculpations, reflected in numerous
manslaughter and accidental death verdicts. Homicide between adult males was
frequently explained by the categories of honor, directly acknowledged in man-
slaughter verdicts. Men who killed women or children were often exonerated by
the invocation of “accident.” Women virtually never benefited from such jury
judgments. More women than men were released before trial, and over twice as
many were acquitted, but those actually convicted were never given the lesser
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verdict of manslaughter, were ineligible for benefit of clergy, and were almost never
pardoned: as a result, women were twice as likely as men to be hanged once
convicted of a killing.5 In particular, their crimes against members of their families,
notably their husbands, carried the stamp of cowardice and treachery for jurors
and judges; provocation was an impossible defense, although murdering husbands
frequently benefited from it.
Walker also reconsiders the peculiarly “female crimes” of older literature. Poison
has often been thought peculiarly the weapon of women, but Walker shows that
in crimes of intimacy it was as much used by men. Finally, in a consideration of
the interpretive issues in infanticide, Walker points out that the judges, almost
from the beginning, treated the offense (in spite of the 1624 statute, with its
reverse onus for concealment) much as they treated all homicide, with culpability
dependent on motive, evidence, and (increasingly) the state of mind of the mother
rather than simply the fact of having concealed a bastard birth. In this and in other
chapters on violence by men and by women that fell short of killing, on varieties
of homicide, on theft (some of it developed from her contribution to the book
that she edited with Jenny Kermode),6 and on “authority, agency and law,” she
disagrees intelligently, sometimes impatiently, with many scholars in the field, in
an original and sustained argument that gender mattered far more in the cultural
impact of law than concentration on a few offenses and on raw statistics can ever
show.
The cultural impact of law is the focus also of the three remaining volumes, but
all of them have a greatly widened field of view and an explicitly comparative
interest in law and imperialism. Like most collections from conferences with a
wide remit,7 the volume edited by Kirkby and Coleborne is varied in its subject
matter, but the authors of the seventeen chapters include many of the best con-
tributors to the legal history of the former British Empire, including Peter Fitz-
patrick, Chris Tomlins, John McLaren, Constance Backhouse, David Philips, Mark
Walters, John Borrows, Diane Kirkby, and John Weaver, among others. The names
suggest the range of the volume: the thirteen American colonies, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, parts of the Pacific, South Africa, and India are among the juris-
dictions; aboriginal custom and law and title, settler incursions, racial definitions,
the rule of law, representative democracy, insanity, appropriation of land, coverture,
nation and gender, and international law are among the subjects. The perspective
varies from that of the postcolonial theorist, through feminist legal scholarship,
to studies more modest about theory but rooted in close archival work, and all
of them (as far as I can judge areas remote from my own work) are of a high
standard. The unifying theme, presented in a brief introduction by the editors,
and the reason behind the conference from which the book developed, was the
late British Empire, a structure of law as much as it was one of peoples, economies,
5 Walker does not consider whether the higher rate of acquittals might be in part explained by the
fact that juries sometimes acquitted because they knew that these mitigating defenses were not available
to women.
6 Jenny Kermode and Garthine Walker, eds., Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England
(London, 1994).
7 In this case, the seventeenth Annual Law and History Conference, organized by the Australian and
New Zealand Law and History Society, with the assistance of the Canadian Law and Society Association,
in July 1998.
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and military power.8 The book appears in a series edited by John M. Mackenzie,
one of the few scholars of the last century to take seriously the comparative study
of a legal topic (game and game laws) on an imperial scale.9 Kirkby and Coleborne
argue that both law and history are “culturally specific ways of knowing and
ordering experience, inherently implicated in relations of power” (p. 2). They, and
many of their contributors, point particularly to the inseparability of law, sover-
eignty, and nation, and the contradictory effects of this for both the colonizers
and the colonized. Many suggestive connections and comparisons appear in the
papers, but individual readers are likely to be particularly interested in specific
themes.
Peter Karsten’s original and hefty volume attempts to reduce the multitude of
variables in studying comparative imperial law through a sustained examination of
“Land,” “Agreements,” and “Accidents”—roughly, what lawyers think of as prop-
erty, contract, and tort. The venues are the United States and what he calls,
concisely if inelegantly, CANZ: Canada, Australia, New Zealand. This is the “Brit-
ish diaspora,” sharing not only national roots, social practices, and language but
also the inheritance of the common law (although Quebec makes a significant
contrasting appearance and Louisiana and Cape Colony brief ones). The law of
each is compared with the others but also with the law of England (sometimes
also Ireland and Scotland) and with indigenous law almost everywhere. The mass
of evidence adduced is remarkable, the approach interesting, although experts in
each jurisdiction or area of law are likely to challenge particular conclusions.
The common law means, distinctively, case law, but custom and statute are also
its sources, and Karsten has much to say about all three. The first has always
interested him.10 Appellate-level case law, interrogated in the way that the legal
realists pioneered, and critical legal scholarship encouraged, has preoccupied an
increasing number of legal historians, who have pushed the idea further. The thickly
described leading case can explain both legal change and much about the society
that produced it. Case law is the daily meat of the law student, of course, but in
the past (and in some legal issues to this day) it was in fact almost all the law, in
spite of the growing incursions of statute from the eighteenth century. And how
and why do judges decide the way they do, particularly in making decisions that
profoundly affect the lives of thousands of their fellow citizens? Hence the ana-
tomical title of his earlier book, a theme that runs throughout this one also.
Nineteenth-century case law was constructed around some received new theories
and policy imperatives, of which the self-regulating market, the self-reliant indi-
vidual, and economic growth were salient: the up-to-date judge of the 1850s knew
in his head that this was the Way Things Had To Work. (Young readers will think
this unremarkable, since law-and-economics is almost the only intellectual para-
digm allowed in many American law schools today, but their elders will remember
a time when the competitive market was known to have disappeared not long after
8 A sustained version of this argument, focused on the law of employment, is Douglas Hay and Paul
Craven, eds., Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562–1955 (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 2004).
9 John M. Mackenzie, The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism (Man-
chester, 1988).
10 Peter Karsten, Head versus Heart: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 1997).
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1850, and unregulated markets were feared for their proven ability to produce
social and economic catastrophe.) But faced with the inevitable hardships such
precedents produced, what did the judge with heart do?
In the “Accidents” section of this book Karsten compares the case law in each
jurisdiction in search of variation: as elsewhere, the method is more classification
than thick description. He finds interesting variations; one example must suffice.
The doctrines critical in industrial accident lawsuits—contributory negligence, vol-
untary assumption of risk, and the justly notorious fellow-servant rule—in England
combined to give almost perfect protection for employers, including railway com-
panies, against lawsuits by their many maimed employees. We know that in England
the judges celebrated and enforced these rules on grounds of economic efficiency
and deterrence to workers’ negligence. It has also long been known that in the
United States, whose judiciary had first elaborated the fellow-servant rule in classic
form in Massachusetts in the 1840s, other doctrines were later used to weaken
the rule, and to allow some workers to recover damages, in the course of the
nineteenth century. What of CANZ, whose commonlaw judiciaries were in theory
bound to follow the heartless doctrines of the House of Lords? Karsten’s survey
of the case law of each jurisdiction suggests that there was much variation, and
that some Canadian jurisdictions and more Australian ones were prepared to dis-
tinguish, slight, ignore, and occasionally bluntly reject what should have been
binding precedent; where it was possible, they sometimes cited more equitable
American law. In Nova Scotia, they were aware that the House of Lords had
imposed the English rule on Scotland in 1858, which had formerly followed the
more benign civilian doctrine. In the Ontario case, Karsten disagrees with some
recent work, arguing that it paints the judges as far more deferential to England
than was in fact the case. The arguments are not conclusive, because they rest in
part on assumptions about the relationship of reported case law to the unknown
dimensions of actual and potential litigation, but certainly the judicial comments
quoted by Karsten suggest a very interesting, and distinctive, form of CANZ
accident law. (He says less about why.) Interestingly, the most proworker senti-
ments and judgments were found in Quebec, although it was the most industri-
alized province in the 1860s, because its jurists jettisoned the English rule after
the promulgation of its revised Code Civile in 1866, which enshrined the civilian
doctrine of comparative negligence. The bench happily applied it.
Besides case law, Karsten is interested in the protean concept of custom, par-
ticularly local custom, which an increasing number of historians have rediscovered,
and which animates his chapters on “Land.” Medievalists always knew custom’s
importance (Mulholland’s chapter in the Cairns and McLeod volume describes
the role of manorial courts in finding it), and it has had profound influence on
recent writing on aboriginal title and rights (see Mark Walter’s chapter in the
Kirkby and Coleborne book). The word can cover both the lived law of a people,
whether recognized or not by the state, and the judicially received custom that
becomes law in a common law system, either as general custom (the common
law) or particular custom (peculiar to a trade or locality).11 Here Karsten explores
the conflict between aboriginal land use and the assumptions of British settlers
11 For an overview of custom and law in England, see D. Hay and N. Rogers, Eighteenth-Century
English Society: Shuttles and Swords (Oxford, 1996), chap. 6 and suggested reading.
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about the acquisition of title by occupation, tenant and landlord law, and the law
of nuisance. He seeks to discover the “lived law” of his several polities and the
many populations in them. Beliefs about what was law clearly depended on who
could make them stick, particularly in newly settled areas far from learned judges
and interfering imperial authorities concerned to protect aboriginal populations
from settler incursions. Dispossession occurred through the alternating modalities
of white settler custom beyond imperial control and, eventually, state structures
of law that validated what had gone before.
Here, and elsewhere, Karsten muddies the water somewhat in not distinguishing
carefully enough between popular beliefs about the legality of custom, popular
custom as lived practice, custom as defined in the high courts, and what magistrates
(those ubiquitous enforcers of the common law) were prepared to tolerate or
encourage as legal. But historians with many different interests will find the ar-
gument stimulating and suggestive. When it comes to statute, he is perhaps less
curious and diligent; the account of employment law in the “Agreements” section
of the book is inadequate and somewhat misleading as a result.12 Karsten holds
an appointment in sociology and history, and historians may feel there is more
sociological structure and less historical explanation than they would wish. But
his book contains an enormous amount of research into the case law, statute, and
legal professions of these jurisdictions and exhibits an extensive acquaintance with
the scholarship in many jurisdictions.
The angle of approach to comparative imperial law by Lauren Benton in Law
and Colonial Cultures is quite different. This is one of the most exciting and richly
suggestive books that I have read in years, comparable in its originality to Patrick
Glenn’s survey of world legal systems but more explicitly historical.13 It explores
the place of law in the early modern world—all those parts of the world affected
by Western legal systems—over a very long period. In part it is a critique (some-
times implicit, often explicit) of the dominant large-canvas explanations of world
history: world systems theory, institutional economic history, and the more recent
literature coming out of colonial cultural studies. Unlike most works in these
genres, Benton’s book takes law seriously, and in a series of well-chosen empirical
studies (usually with a significant amount of work in primary materials) she explores
the interactions of law, cultures, colonial relations of power and subordination,
economies, and ideologies. Her willingness to tackle the question of how colonial
regimes in general, and different legal systems in particular, were articulated over
this long course of history has resulted in an immensely interesting and convincing
book. Very little work has tried to offer general answers to the question of how
the dominant Western legal regimes interacted with each other in colonial settings,
as well as with the immense diversity of indigenous legal regimes they encountered
in Asia, Africa, and the rest of the world. (There are a handful of titles, with more
limited aims.)14 Students of modern international law will be fascinated by the
description of structures of expectation generated in the early modern world by
an immensely fluid system of low-level mercantile and colonial initiatives. Histo-
12 Hay and Craven, Masters, Servants, and Magistrates, chap. 3.
13 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford, 2000).
14 For example, M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws
(Oxford, 1975).
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rians will enjoy the detail and broader conclusions of the accounts of specific
intergroup relations and the role of law both within and between communities in
contact. (An instance is the author’s exploration of the Janus-faced role of indig-
enous interpreters and enforcers of the colonizer’s law.) Benton’s anthropologically
informed willingness to take equally seriously all varieties of legal regimes and her
sensitivity to their different cognitive modes give her accounts of the contact of
Western imperial with indigenous law both specificity and theoretical richness.
Law and Colonial Cultures is a synthesis and critique of a wide range of secondary
writing, informed by current theoretical debate, which she has tested against care-
fully chosen evidence resulting from primary research. The book ranges over the
histories of Iberian Europe, Spanish colonial America, French west Africa, Australia,
Dutch and British south Africa, and Bengal. Experts in all those areas will have
things to say about sources, details of interpretation, and more recent research
that could have been used. But writers of broad interpretive forays cannot do
everything, and readers in British imperial and postcolonial histories will find that
Benton has made good use of the writing on south Africa, India, and Australia
and has illuminated these works with the bold explanatory propositions of the
book: propositions about culture, economy, and especially the place of law in
human societies. She situates each within an explanation that describes a trajectory
from fluid, personal, immensely variegated yet mutually recognizing legal regimes
(often of extremely local jurisdiction) to the construction of the dominant and
dominating legal regimes of high imperialism in the late nineteenth century. As
the largest and most powerful expression of colonialism of that period, the British
Empire is a prime exhibit for explorations of the place of law in colonial capture,
transformation, and resistance.
The titles reviewed here show the extent to which legal history has been absorbed
into general history and the extent to which the history of law is integral to
understanding power, economy, gender, race, class, ideology, nation, and empire.
The best of this writing integrates technically sophisticated accounts of legal doc-
trines and institutions with the most recent scholarship in cognate fields of history.
All of it demonstrates the centrality of law to historical explanation.
Douglas Hay, York University, Toronto
